Anderson S. Jackson III and Billy Ray Dew appeal their convictions on eleven counts of conspiracy to violate and violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666, for theft by fraud and bribery. Jackson was director of the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) for the City of Monroe, Louisiana, which operates city golf courses, parks, the museum, civic center, and other recreational venues for the City of Monroe. The jury found that Jackson received kickbacks for awarding construction and repair contracts for the DCA to co-defendant Billy Ray Dew, owner of two construction businesses and to other contractors as well. Finding insufficient evidence that the DCA or the City of Monroe received over $10,000 per year in federal funding as required to satisfy a statutory element of the offense, we vacate the judgments of conviction and the sentences and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal.

One element of the offense of conviction is that the organization, government, or agency of which Jackson was an agent received, in any one year period, over $10,000 in benefits from a Federal program.1 Defendants raise a number of issues regarding the alleged federal character of the funds received by the DCA, one of which is a jurisdictional question.

We examine the question of jurisdiction as a threshold matter. To confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a federal court, an indictment need only charge a defendant with an offense against the United States in language similar to that used by the relevant statute. United States v. Desurra, 865 F.2d 651, 654 (5th Cir.1989). The indictment sufficiently invoked the district court's jurisdiction, alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 666, including the allegation that the City of Monroe received federal funds in excess of $10,000 for each calendar year at issue. The district court had jurisdiction over the case because a violation of federal law was charged, id., regardless of the sufficiency of the Government's proof.

Defendants contend that the Government failed to prove: that the City received federal benefits in excess of $10,000; that federal funds were present in the accounts from which Jackson made disbursements; or any nexus between the federal funding and the offense conduct.2 In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Greer, 137 F.3d 247, 249 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 920, 118 S. Ct. 2305, 141 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1998).

A. Federal Sources.

We first consider the sufficiency of the Government's evidence that the entity of which Jackson was an agent received over $10,000 per year of federal funds. The Government offered evidence of funding received by the City of Monroe for the Louisiana Folk Life Festival. Billy Gene Pearson, Director of Administration for the City, testified that, for the City's fiscal year ended April 30, 1997, the DCA received $12,900 from the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), and, for fiscal year ended April 30, 1998, $10,090 from the same source.

No grant documents in evidence substantiate receipts from the NEH of those amounts, however.3 Dr. Michael Luster, Director of the Louisiana Folklife Festival, testified that the City received grants from only state and local entities.4 The documentary evidence substantiated Luster's testimony and demonstrated unequivocally that the $12,900 funding came from the Northeast Louisiana Arts Council (NELAC), and that other grants were from the state or local agencies.5 No corroboration of any receipt of $10,090 is apparent from the documents. Dr. Luster testified that the amount was in error, that $10,000 was the correct amount, and that the grant was from the Louisiana Endowment for the Humanities (LEH) — not NEH.6 One of defendants' exhibits would suggest such a receipt of $10,000 from LEH in calendar year 1997.7 The Government concedes that the alleged federal funding was not received by the City directly but by Louisiana agencies for further distribution to local or regional arts projects meeting the criteria established by NEH or the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA).

The record supports an inference that the City received some funding indirectly from those federal sources via local and state agencies.8 Specifically concerning Pearson's testimony that the DCA received $12,900 from NEH, the record contains evidence that this funding, although actually channeled through NELAC, did have federal origins.9 Assuming Pearson's testimony about $10,090 of NEH funds corresponds to the 1997 LEH grant agreement for $10,000, we will further assume for purposes of this analysis that the record will support an inference that some of that LEH grant had federal origins as well.10

B. Minimum Per-Year Amounts.

The questions then become how much of the grants from local or state agencies were of federal origin, and when such funds were received. The evidence is insufficient if it shows only that the City received some federal funds; the statute requires proof that the organization or agency received federal benefits "in excess of $10,000" per year. 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). The one-year period may be any continuous twelve-month period that includes the commission of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 666(d)(5). This is an exact numeric minimum per year that must be supported by record evidence.

The indictment charged this monetary element for the calendar years 1997 and 1998.11 The Government in its case in chief attempted to show the requisite receipts with the testimony of Pearson, and argues that a finding of more than $10,000 in federal funds per calendar year is also supported by defendants' exhibits.

1. Pearson's Testimony — Fiscal Years.

Even with the assistance of evidence suggesting an indirect federal receipt in the amount of $12,900, the amount Pearson mentioned, the record does not support a jury finding that the $12,900 receipt occurred in calendar year 1997 or 1998. Pearson's testimony was only that the receipt occurred in the City's fiscal year ending in 1997 — a period that straddles calendar years 1996 and 1997 and does not suggest a specific calendar year. Other evidence does suggest a calendar year, however. Dr. Luster stated that the City received $12,900 for the 1996 Festival from NELAC, which funding originated with a NEA grant to NELAC on September 27, 1994. Through Dr. Luster's efforts, NEA's federal grant to NELAC was modified to extend its availability through September 14, 1996, the day of the 1996 Festival.12 A NELAC report to NEA shows $12,900 as the "federal share of outlays" during the period from 5/1/95 to 9/14/96 (ex. D-1338). This evidence cannot support a jury finding that the $12,900 was received in 1997.

With no evidence to sustain a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the $12,900 receipt of indirect federal funds occurred in one of the calendar years charged, or that the other receipt Pearson mentioned ($10,09013) occurred at all, we cannot sustain the guilty verdict based on Pearson's testimony. See United States v. Barrera, 547 F.2d 1250, 1255 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that acquittal must be granted when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, is such that a reasonably minded jury must have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the essential elements of the crime charged).

2. Defendants' Exhibits — Calendar Years 1997 and 1998.

The alternative support the Government offers for the verdict is Defendants' evidence. The City received a total of $10,027 for 1997 via the following checks:

$7,590 LEH check dated June 13, 1997 (ex. D-1346); and

$2,437 State of Louisiana, Department of Treasury check dated July 17, 1997 (ex. D-1348).

The $7,590 check of June 1997 was part of LEH Grant # 96-415-024 in the amount of $10,000 for the Festival.14 We find sufficient evidence that this payment of $7,590 constituted federal funds, because the LEH letter of August 20, 1996, awarding the grant refers to the award as "This grant of federal funds." Ex. D-1340. A reasonable jury might have inferred from that phraseology that the entirety of the grant was of federal origin, including every dollar of the $7,590 check received in June 1997.15

Our next question is therefore what portion of the $2,437 check of July 1997 was of federal origin. To show more than $10,000 of federal funding for the calendar year, the Government would have to prove that virtually all of the $2,437 received was of federal origin.16 The $2,437 check was part of DOA grant # FY97155.17 Some underlying federal (NEH) support for DOA grant # FY97155 is apparent from the evidence, but the evidence suggests multiple sources of support.18 Even considering this evidence most favorably to support the verdict, we find it insufficient to permit an inference beyond a reasonable doubt of how much of the $2,437 check from the State was of federal origin. Accordingly, the evidence is insufficient to bring the total federal funds for 1997 to more than $10,000.

For calendar year 1998, the Government suggests that a total of $11,500 in federal funds was received by the City from the following two documents in evidence:

$2,900 enclosed as "regrant payment" for the 1998 Festival per August 3, 1998, letter from LEH, re proposal # 98-415-139 (ex. D-1344); and

$8,600 check of December 21, 1998, from LEH (ex. D-1349).

Both these payments were part of the July 14, 1998, LEH grant # 98-415-139 agreement for $11,500 to the City for the 1998 Festival.19 The Government conceded in brief that LEH receives funds from NEH as well as from the State of Louisiana and corporate and individual donors, effectively admitting that a LEH grant contains some federal as well as some non-federal funds.

To suggest that the foregoing receipts satisfy the statute, the Government also argues that the federal organizations retain control over "pass-through funds," either through the grant agreements (such as requiring NEA approval for a regrant to programs around the state) or by statutory provisions requiring accountability or adherence to certain criteria. Assuming without deciding that the level of federal control means that the funds so distributed retained their character as federal funds, we must still find evidence in the record to support a jury finding that over $10,000 per year of such pass-through funds had federal origins.

The Government provides not a single record reference to suggest how much of the $11,500 was of federal origin. Federal control cannot supply the missing element of a certain minimum dollar amount. It is not sufficient that the Louisiana State Arts Council, LEH, or NELAC strives to comply with the requirements of NEH and NEA or federal law. Nor is evidence that LEH is "affiliated with" NEH probative of the extent of financial dependence. We do not have to examine the level of federal "strings attached" to these grants, because no threshold showing has been made that the minimum amount of federal funds was passed through the state agency to the City.

Our extensive review of the record reveals a dearth of evidence to support the essential element that the City received more than $10,000 per year in federal funds. To meet its burden of presenting evidence from which a jury might properly find this element proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Government must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence; it must produce evidence which, if believed, affords a substantial basis in fact from which the defendant's guilt can be inferred. United States v. James, 510 F.2d 546, 552 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855, 96 S. Ct. 105, 46 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1975). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Government, we conclude that a reasonably minded jury would necessarily have a reasonable doubt that over $10,000 of federal funding was received by the City in 1997 and 1998 as alleged in the indictment.

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment convicting Jackson and Dew and remand the matter for entry of a judgment of acquittal.

VACATED; REMANDED.